Unpacking the Hostages–Ceasefire Dilemma

September 17, 2024

by: Ilse Strauss

Tuesday, 17 September 2024 | It’s supposed to be simple, mainstream media tells you. The war between Israel and Hamas could be over in minutes. The hostages could come home, the suffering would cease and everything would go back to the way it was on October 6. All that’s needed is for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to budge a bit, to compromise on his demands. Judging from all the demonstrations, that’s what the people of Israel want. And after nearly a year of war, that’s surely what Hamas wants too.

Ah yes. If mainstream media is to be believed, Israel is a nation in complete uproar over its leader’s failure to reach an agreement with Hamas, who, in turn, is rearing for peace to return and is thus eager to see the hostages safely home—provided that Israel can just compromise.

It’s not as black and white as that though. In fact, as with everything in the Middle East, the situation is infinitely more intricate than one would hope—and rather immune to solutions that would seem logical to a Western mindset.

First things first, let me be clear. The nation of Israel faces terrible choices. Regardless of what Jerusalem chooses, someone gets hurt. But choose Israel must. Hamas made sure of that.

The attack on October 7 went well beyond the worst atrocity inflicted on the Jewish people since the Holocaust. It also backed Israel into a corner, forcing its hand to make some of the most terrible choices imaginable. Hamas triggered the avalanche on October 7, and then retreated to the safety of their tunnels to watch their civilians bear the brunt of the retaliation and marvel at the world condemning the Jewish state—as they knew it would, as they planned it would.

Moreover, the terror group is going to great lengths to fan the flames of psychological warfare. Early this month, German paper Bild exposed the contents of confidential documents obtained from the computer of a senior Hamas leader, unveiling the terror group’s calculated strategy to exploit hostages, manipulate Israeli public opinion and rebuild its military capabilities—all under the guise of ceasefire negotiations.

The strategy, which was reportedly approved by Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar personally, entails intentionally abusing hostages to leverage its negotiating position. It also advocates for “exerting psychological pressure on the families of the [hostages]…so that public pressure on the enemy government increases” and sowing discord among the Israeli public to pressure the government to agree to the terms of a deal and extend a ceasefire to Hamas’s benefit.

The document further reveals Hamas isn’t interested in a quick end to the war. And although its “military capacity has been weakened,” the terror organization is planning to “reorganize our ranks and military capabilities.”

The document further stresses painting Israel as the scapegoat, bearing the full responsibility of failed negotiations. If Israel rejects a deal tabled by the US, “the media must be made aware that Hamas agreed, but that the deal failed due to Israel’s stubbornness.” At no time should Hamas ever be seen to be “responsible for the failure of an agreement,” a translation of the document reads.

Yet in what Bild described as unusual, the document makes no mention of Gazan civilians, underscoring Hamas’s cruel practice of using their people as expendable pawns to achieve their goal.

Hamas’s strategy has been a roaring success.

Let’s take the Israeli public. The incremental release of photos and video footage of hostages held within Gaza, the cold-blooded execution of six hostages at the end of August and the blatant public statement by a Hamas spokesperson that hostages would be murdered if the Israel Defense Forces come close to rescuing them have wrought havoc on the hearts and minds of Israelis—as Hamas knew it would, as Hamas planned it would.

Keep in mind that the Israeli population is tiny, which means everyone personally knows someone held hostage in Gaza. This is not something happening somewhere to someone else. This is family.

The sorrow and anger have divided Israel into largely two camps. One camp holds the government and its leader, Netanyahu, responsible, taking to the streets to demand a deal—any deal—that would see the hostages safely home. While the mainstream media focusses on the demonstrations, there is another camp. Many Israelis see through Hamas’s strategy. They argue that a deal at any cost might save the lives of the remaining hostages, but in a way that would ensure many more Israeli hostages and victims in the future.

Yes, there’s disagreement. Yes, there’s a split. But perhaps the dilemma can be best understood when viewed from a personal perspective. If it were my child, mother, father or sibling in captivity, I would most certainly be part of the Israeli society pushing for a ceasefire deal. On the other hand, if I were a citizen of a sovereign country that had been attacked by a jihadist organization in one of the worst terror attacks in history, a jihadist organization that pledged to repeat the attack, I would also want my government to make every effort to ensure that they never get the opportunity to make good on that promise.

Personal perspectives aside, there are some questions that beg answers in the hostage–ceasefire dilemma. First, is it really in the Israeli government’s power to make or break such a deal? Second, if yes, at what cost? Third, is this a cost Israel can afford to pay?

Perhaps the first question has the simplest answer. US President Joe Biden unveiled the original framework for a hostage–ceasefire deal on May 31. Both Israel and Hamas agreed to it. Yet the deal was then split into three phases, with the details of each phase to be negotiated. So far, the attention has been on Phase One.

Then, on August 16, the US presented a Final Bridging Proposal. Israel agreed. Hamas did not. In fact, as negotiators gathered in Doha in middle August to hammer out the details of Phase One, Hamas representatives refused to attend, despite the fact that some of the terror group’s members call Qatar home.

Days later, Hamas executed six hostages, some of whom were on the list of hostages to be released in Phase One. In other words, Hamas murdered the very hostages who were the subject of the negotiations, thus technically rendering the deal void. The Americans considered the executions such a breach that they called into question Hamas’s commitment to agreeing to any deal, or whether the terror group saw the negotiations as a stalling technique and a ploy for sympathy. In fact, the Americans has gone as far as describing Hamas, not Israel, as the obstacle.

It didn’t stop with the six murdered hostages either. A senior US official admitted days after their death during a press briefing, “Hamas has been putting some things on the table that have been complete nonstarters [regarding] the exchange, and they’re different than what was agreed months ago.”

Then came the publication of the Hamas strategy authorized by Sinwar, which spells out the terror group’s deception in black and white: use the hostages to sow discord in Israel; divide the public; agree to nothing; blame Israel for the lack of agreement—and garner international sympathy in the process.

There’s also the matter of the Philadelphi Corridor [Israeli code name for the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt], which is often hailed as the sticking point in the negotiations. Is it really though?

Netanyahu is indeed standing firm that any deal to secure a ceasefire in exchange for the hostages must include an Israeli presence on the 8.5-mile-long [13.6 km.] strip of land that marks the border between Gaza and Egypt. Why? Over the past two months, the IDF has uncovered more than 150 tunnels under the Philadelphi Corridor, offering easy passage from Egypt to Gaza and back. Some of these tunnels are large enough for cars to drive through. Some were dug straight under Egyptian army posts. It is these tunnels that Iran used to arm and equip Hamas’s arsenal with tens of thousands of missiles, automatic weapons, RPGs and more to be used against Israel—before October 7, on that fateful day and in its aftermath.

Hamas has stated unequivocally that they would repeat the October 7 attack. In fact, according to Hamas’s founding charter, the terror organization’s reason for existence is not the prosperity of the Palestinian people but the destruction of Israel. And if the Philadelphi Corridor remains in Hamas’s grasp, it might take few years, but the terror group will rearm—courtesy of Iran—and attack Israel again for October 7 II.

“The axis of evil needs the Philadelphi Corridor; for this reason, we need the Philadelphi Corridor,” Netanyahu said. “This corridor determines our entire future.”

Israel’s Security Cabinet agrees. On August 29, they voted to support Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s position that Israel must maintain a military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor indefinitely. Only Defense Minister Yoav Gallant voted against.

That explains the importance of the Philadelphi Corridor. But is it the sticking point? The Americans say no. According to the mediators of the deal, the much-debated buffer zone between Gaza and Egypt was not even the main focus of the talks in Doha in August. In fact, Israel has actually agreed to reduce its forces along the Philadelphi Corridor to help advance the deal, despite the original framework deal on May 31 not even mentioning the Philadelphi Corridor. Phase One calls for the IDF to withdraw only from populated areas in Gaza, and although the Philadelphi Corridor does intersect with some populated areas, it is not classified as a populated area.

Where does all this leave Israel? With terrible choices. Regardless of what Jerusalem chooses, someone gets hurt. And judging by the past 11 months, the international community will be right alongside Israel—not in solidarity or support—but pointing an accusatory finger.

For there to be peace in Israel and Gaza, Israel must defeat Hamas—for Israel’s sake, but also for that of the Palestinians. Let’s be clear. Hamas has never been a Palestinian liberation movement. It’s an identity foisted on the terror group by Western liberals on college campuses in the aftermath of the October 7 attack to fit an anti-Israel narrative. In truth, Hamas has been shockingly clear about their objective, which has never been the peaceful coexistence of a Jewish and Palestinian state flourishing side-by-side. Hamas’s raison d’etre is spelled out in its founding charter, and entails the annihilation of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state on every inch of land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

In short? Hamas is not fighting for the well-being of the Palestinians. Hamas is fighting for the destruction of Israel—and they are using the Palestinians as cannon fodder in their fight.

Posted on September 17, 2024

Source: (Bridges for Peace, September 17, 2024)

Photo Credit: Yossipik/Wikimedia.org

Photo License: Wikimedia