IDF Warns of Soldier Shortage and Extreme Burden on Troops in Coming Years

March 10, 2025

by: Yoav Zitun ~ Ynetnews

Monday, 10 March 2025 | More strain, more missions, and almost no time off—one of the most alarming failures revealed in investigations of the October 7 terror attack was the IDF General Staff’s decision five years ago to reduce the number of combat troops stationed in security outposts on weekends by half. This move was primarily intended to boost motivation for enlisting in combat units.

That decision—recently described by the IDF’s Southern Command as a “mistake”—came at a heavy price on that tragic Saturday, particularly at sparsely defended outposts like Nahal Oz, where 53 soldiers lost their lives. The reversal of this policy is just the beginning of the military’s desperate effort to cope with an extreme, multi-front burden that is only expected to grow in the coming years—not just for reservists but for regular soldiers as well.

The IDF’s Operations Directorate, responsible for force deployment across Israel’s borders and in the West Ban [Judea and Samaria], estimates that Israel is entering a period of manpower shortages not seen since the days of the Security Zone in southern Lebanon, followed shortly by the Second Intifada in the early 2000s. The reason: Israeli policy, shaped by years of deceptive calm, now aims to prevent Hezbollah and Hamas from re-emerging as full-fledged military forces—like they were before the current war. The cost of that effort will be borne by Israeli society.

Concern in the IDF General Staff

Regular soldiers are already feeling the strain. According to senior officers, the grueling deployment schedule is unlikely to change in the coming years: 17 days on duty, followed by a short three- to four-day leave. That means a brief break for combat troops once every two and a half weeks—at best, once a month if there are no escalations, security alerts, or lockdowns. For the past 15 years, combat troops were able to go home once every two weeks.

“The Israeli public, new recruits, active soldiers, and especially their parents should adjust their expectations—they will see much less of their sons and daughters in the coming years,” the IDF warns. “Even if prolonged combat in Gaza does not resume and even if fronts like southern Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank remain ‘calm’ as they are now.”

Military officials add, “We are doing everything we can to ease the burden on reservists, who are completely exhausted. But regular combat troops will bear the brunt. We need thousands of soldiers to man the new outposts established inside Lebanese territory, in the Syrian Golan Heights, and along the Gaza Strip’s buffer zone. On top of that, we have doubled the number of regional battalions stationed around Gaza and the Galilee compared to the pre-war period. This new reality will not change in the coming years, even under the most optimistic scenarios.”

The IDF General Staff—including newly appointed Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir—is deeply concerned about the severe manpower shortage, while political leaders remain indifferent. More than 10,000 soldiers have been removed from IDF service since the war began. According to IDF data, approximately 12,000 soldiers—most of them combat troops—have been killed or wounded since October 7. Additionally, the need for increased border defense and the rapid expansion of armored and engineering brigades have left the IDF with a growing manpower deficit, the burden of which will be felt by both current and future servicemembers through extreme workloads not seen in two decades.

Another factor in the manpower shortage is one of Lt. Gen. Zamir’s first decisions: the creation of a new infantry brigade—the first since the 900th battalions were merged into the Kfir Brigade 20 years ago. The IDF currently has five active-duty infantry brigades in addition to Kfir: Nahal, Paratroopers, Golani and Givati. At least one new engineering battalion will also be established, and tank brigade reconnaissance companies—shut down in the past decade—will be reinstated. These changes will require thousands of additional combat soldiers that the IDF currently lacks, meaning the burden will only increase for existing troops.

To fill these ranks, the IDF is reaching out to older former combat soldiers in the civilian population, attempting to form new reserve brigades with volunteers aged 40 to 60. Despite high motivation, these units remain understaffed and rely on volunteers with varying levels of fitness and other personal constraints.

“We are stretched to the limit, and every IDF combat soldier feels it already,” officials say. “Even in basic training, new recruits are affected by the burden. After just two months of infantry training, some platoons are sent to reinforce active units for a week or two, cutting into their own training. The only way to break this cycle is to add forces at an unprecedented scale. The number of rapid-response units—the forces that must be on standby for major incidents—has tripled or quadrupled, and this will not change.”

Military sources dismissed claims that the newly formed “Hasmonean Brigade” is a meaningful solution. “It’s misleading to present it as a full-fledged ultra-Orthodox combat brigade when, in reality, only one company has been recruited so far. It’s not even a band-aid for the IDF’s combat manpower crisis.”

 Holding Ground Instead of Raids

The challenges are not limited to Gaza, the West Bank, or the northern border. Even soldiers stationed along Israel’s traditionally quieter Arava border, primarily tasked with stopping drug and weapons smuggling from Sinai, describe the hardship of going home just once every two and a half weeks. “Of our four days off, we lose an entire day traveling home. When we ask to swap leave schedules, commanders agree only if the adjustment results in an even longer stretch of service, sometimes requiring us to serve 21 consecutive days before a break.”

One of the IDF Operations Directorate’s strategies for managing the strain is to send entire units on short leave periods of five to seven days, as was done with Givati and Nahal battalions after a month or two of continuous combat in Gaza. While this offers a brief reprieve, it comes only after 50 to 60 days without seeing home, depending on mission intensity.

“Reservists are the first to receive any relief. We’re trying to ensure they don’t serve more than two and a half months in 2025, but many will still be called up for two extended deployments within a year,” IDF sources said.

Uncertainty remains over the IDF’s broader plans for Gaza. The political leadership recently authorized another mass call-up of hundreds of thousands of reservists under the open-ended emergency mobilization order. But many reserve commanders have warned officials about the toll this has taken. “Even with staggered rotations, only 50% to 70% of reservists currently respond to call-ups due to prolonged absences from work, studies, and family life. The strain cannot be eased with money alone.

“For large-scale operations in Gaza, more people might answer the call. But they have already fought there and in Lebanon for months. Family pressures are mounting—everyone is asking, ‘Why can’t someone else do their part?’ This must be factored into future planning, as it will impact force availability for future missions.”

Posted on March 10, 2025

Source: (Excerpt of an article originally published by Ynetnews on March 10, 2025. Time-related language has been modified to reflect our republication today. See original article at this link.)

Photo Credit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit/Wikimedia.org

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