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Syrian Army Regroups and Rearms for Confrontation with Israel

August 6, 2024

by: Lior Ben Ari ~ Ynetnews

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2017

Tuesday, 6 August 2024 | Historically considered a relentless enemy of Israel, the Syrian army’s status declined due to the country’s civil war. Materially and publicly, the army is no longer perceived as a national army, but as “Assad’s army.” Despite this, it is rearming and attempting to operate with the resources it has.

The Syrian army, initially formed from the French Army of the Levant in Lebanon and Syria, played an integral role in the combined Arab assault on the newly established State of Israel in 1948. “We couldn’t push it out of all the territory it occupied in Israel, and since has been a pesky and provocative enemy from the Golan Heights,” said Prof. Eyal Zisser, a modern Lebanese and Syrian history expert and vice-rector at Tel Aviv University.

Like many armies in the region, Syria’s military attempted coups, and in February 1966, a group of young officers from the leftist faction of the ruling Ba’ath party seized power. According to Prof. Zisser, this faction did not receive substantial public support and faced bitter internal conflicts, prompting them to unite the country with a familiar ideology—uniting everyone against Israel.

For this reason, the Syrians worked to divert the Jordan River’s water sources, initiated conflicts in demilitarized zones and sponsored Fatah terrorist attacks, which they helped establish in Damascus as early as 1965.

Despite their bold declarations and aggressive policies, Prof. Zisser explains that in the early days of the 1967 Six Day War, the Syrians tried to maintain a low profile. “Their military actions were likely intended to create an alibi for themselves in response to Egyptian pressure to uphold their part of the defense agreement.”

The defeat in the Six Day War profoundly affected Hafez al-Assad, then a young defense minister. Three years later, he seized power in a military coup and focused on rebuilding the nation’s military might. “These years saw a very significant increase in the power and strength of the Syrian army. Beyond the war with Israel, the army was always part of the defense of the regime, and its mission was a combination of both,” explained Prof. Zisser.

In the years following the Six Day War, the Syrian army led numerous incidents, sometimes directly and sometimes simply by allowing Palestinian terrorist organizations to operate from Syrian territory. The peak was the “Three Day War” in 1970, which began with a Syrian bombardment along the border, during which they attempted to attack IDF [Israel Defense Forces] infantry positions. In response, the IDF launched an operation that destroyed five Syrian frontline positions and struck military camps deep within the country.

At the beginning of 1973, there was relative calm on the front, but then the Yom Kippur War erupted. “They sought revenge in 1973. Although they were eventually repelled, they initially had significant successes—capturing Mount Hermon and taking control of parts of the Golan Heights,” said Prof. Zisser.

From a national army to Assad’s army

To understand the current Syrian army, it’s essential to look back at the start of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s tenure, the son of Hafez. “The Syrian Army of 2024 is the result of 24 years under Bashar al-Assad,” said Col. (Res.) Miri Eisin, a former senior intelligence officer and fellow at the ICT [Institute for Counter-Terrorism]. “The Syrian army has taken a very different approach compared to other regional armies. When the war against Assad began in Syria, he had a large regular army. The entire organizational structure is still intact on paper.”

According to CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] data, before the civil war in 2011, the Syrian armed forces consisted of approximately 300,000 soldiers, with 200,000–250,000 being Syrian army personnel. Additionally, the army had about 300,000 reservists. “This is an army based on corps, with a very Soviet–Russian integration. These corps are mixed units of tanks, infantry, artillery and engineering. Everything is integrated from the battalion level to the corps,” added Col. (Res.) Eisin.

The army’s corps are distributed across the country, with the border with Israel under the command of the 1st Corps, based in the Damascus area. The most critical division for future combat with Israel is the 7th Division, which is linked to Iran and Hezbollah and “is positioned closest to the border,” explained Dr. Carmit Valensi, head of the Northern Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

The civil war that erupted in Syria in 2011 caused a significant crisis for the Syrian army, which had been strengthening in preparation for a potential future confrontation with Israel. “Certain commanders in the corps opposed Bashar and defected with their units to the Free Syrian Army, while others remained loyal. The army completely split, but on paper, the corps numbers remained, though without any real significance,” explained Col. (Res.) Eisin.

Millions of Syrian civilians either fled the country and became refugees or joined the ranks of the rebels, leading to a severe manpower shortage for the Syrian army. In response, the regime recruited anyone it could. The CIA reported that men in their late 40s and 50s, who were previously exempt from service, were conscripted without a discharge date.

The gaps in the Syrian army were filled by external actors who helped Assad maintain regime stability but also gained significant footholds in Syria. “Many Syrian officers deserted at the start of the war, and the Iranians and Russians somewhat filled the vacuum,” said Dr. Valensi.

Hezbollah also got involved and joined the forces of the 1st Corps stationed in the Golan Heights. “It wasn’t a Hezbollah unit, but Hezbollah was considered to have the best military capability and training compared to all the Shiites who joined the army,” explained Col. (Res.) Eisin.

In 2021, the IDF revealed that Naqib Bashar Al-Hussein, the commander of a reconnaissance company in the 90th Brigade of the Syrian army, assisted Hezbollah with observations and coordinated the repair of Iran’s and the terror organization’s observation posts. He was described as a liaison between Hezbollah’s southern headquarters and the 1st Corps of the Syrian army.

Foreign battles over control of the army

For years, until about 2018, there was a certain competition between the Russians and the Iranians for influence over the Syrian army. “Throughout the years of Russian involvement in Syria, the Syrian army has gradually become a somewhat different army,” said Col. (Res.) Eisin.

“They no longer brought in tanks but shifted to light infantry. Everything seen in the Russia–Ukraine war also affected Syria. The 1st Corps theoretically has three divisions —two mechanized and one armored—but in practice, it’s hard to say what they contain and if there are any weapons at all.”

“The war in Ukraine clearly diverted Russian attention from the competition, allowing Iran to further establish itself in the Syrian army,” said Dr. Valensi. “We see more Iranian presence following the war in Ukraine. We see how Russia reduces its investment in the 5th Corps—the body most identified with the Russians in the Syrian army. The Russians chose who would head it, and there have been many clashes with pro-Iranian forces. The Russian involvement in the Syrian army was one of the reasons why Israel initially refused to take a clear stance against Russia at the start of the war with Ukraine. Their presence on the ground and military assistance—which also included advanced air defense capabilities—were significant factors in Israel’s decision to remain on the fence. But it seems that Russian involvement in the Syrian army is diminishing.

“A few months ago, it was reported that the Russians are reducing the funding of the corps by 50%. They don’t have the time, attention or economic capability to maintain it at the same level as before,” added Dr. Valensi.

“Additionally, there are frictions between Syrian and Russian military elements who were somewhat part of the Syrian army. Suddenly, we hear Russian complaints about being excluded from intelligence materials and professional activities. There is a shake-up of Russian dominance, and Iran is exploiting the vacuum.”

The one filling Russia’s vacuum, and who’s been there longer before, is Iran. “I can say quite confidently today that the Iranians are very dominant in the Syrian army. Even if they do not directly send people, they know how to create allies or representatives who are identified and loyal to Iran—like Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother,” said Dr. Valensi.

Since late 2016, the Iranians have been establishing two main organizations on the border with Israel: The Southern Command and The Golan File—essentially a Hezbollah extension. A skilled combat force is stationed on the border and ready to attack Israel both on the ground and with missiles and rockets.

According to Dr. Valensi, they are not always easy to identify. “I hear that these Shiite militia operatives, Iranian proxies, sometimes wear Syrian army uniforms, making it very difficult to clearly distinguish between the army and the militias.”

The war against ISIS

In the later stages of the civil war, ISIS [Islamic State] emerged as one of the most significant groups the Syrian army had to confront. The Syrian army was not the only force fighting against the Islamic State, nor even the main one. According to reports, the coalition forces against ISIS, along with the Syrian Democratic Forces (the rebels), were the primary forces fighting ISIS in Syria.

Despite the official declaration that the organization was defeated in Syria and Iraq, it continues to function, adapting to the methods used against it. In recent years, it has started to resurface. Russia joined the fight only in 2015 when it became clear that ISIS posed a threat to the stability of the Assad regime in Syria. ISIS has not forgotten or forgiven the Russians for this, and to this day, Moscow pays the price.

In March, 145 people were killed and over 100 injured in a shooting and bomb attack at the Crocus City Hall concert venue in the city of Krasnogorsk in the Moscow region of Russia. Several hours after the attack began, the media quoted the Amaq News Agency associated with the Islamic State, and a security source told the agency that ISIS operatives “attacked a large concentration of Christians in the suburbs of the Russian capital, Moscow, killed and injured hundreds, and caused significant damage to the site before returning safely to their bases.”

Military buildup and fear

The Syrian civil war ended, Assad regained control over the Syrian Golan Heights by the summer of 2018, but the army is still not strong and powerful enough. It is an army facing numerous challenges, including budget constraints and a lack of quality personnel, while the entire country is in a severe economic crisis.

Despite the years that have passed, the country has not yet recovered. While civilian reconstruction is minimal and ranked low in the regime’s priorities, Assad is heavily investing in rebuilding the military. The Russians, understanding that keeping Assad in power requires military investment, are significantly aiding him. They assist in reorganizing military units and integrating the militias formed during the civil war into the army.

One of the most recent Israeli attacks in Syria occurred before the civil war, in 2007, when Israel attacked the Syrian reactor in Deir ez-Zor. The Syrians have not responded to this attack to this day. “Generally, our confrontations with the Syrians are not direct. We attack things in Syria related to Iran and Hezbollah, not really Syria itself,” noted Prof. Zisser. “They have never retaliated against these attacks. Why? Because of their worldview—’We are too weak to be dragged into war, it suits us to contain.'”

According to Col. (Res.) Eisin, “The Syrian Air Force exists only on paper; they haven’t built a new one. They are starting to do this now, but they don’t have planes. There is a Russian airbase in the Alawite region, not far from Tartus, but it belongs to Moscow. The Syrians currently have nowhere to train pilots.”

The new service plan

The Syrian army may be weaker than Israel’s, but the country’s military strength is not very weak. Syria is ranked 60th out of 145 countries on the GlobalFirepower website. Before the war, men aged 18 to 42 were required to serve up to 30 months of compulsory service, after which they were called up for reserve duty as needed by the army.

According to Dr. Valensi, it is estimated that the Syrian army currently includes about 250,000 active and reserve soldiers and officers. The Syrian Defense Ministry has recently announced a three-phase plan to reduce the number of reservists currently in active service—by the end of October 2025.

In an interview with Syrian television, the ministry’s director, Ahmad Yusuf Suleiman, said, “Tens of thousands will be released by the end of the year, and the same next year, while maintaining combat readiness and achieving the interests of the country’s residents.”

According to the Saudi network Al Arabiya, the Syrian army currently consists of three main groups—volunteers, conscripts and reservists. In the early years of the civil war, the army, according to various publications, lost half of its estimated 300,000 soldiers and officers.

During the civil war, young people in Syria served in the reserves for many years, sometimes up to six years consecutively. Syrian President Assad admitted in an interview in 2015 that “if the army did not have reserve forces, it would not have been able to withstand the very tough four and a half years of war.”

According to Suleiman’s new announcement, in the third phase of the plan, the maximum reserve service will be set at two years. He said that the goal of the Syrian army is to become an “advanced army primarily based on volunteers.”

How much should Israel fear the Syrian army on the border? “Since October 7, we have all been throwing around the term ‘terror army.’ We say this about Hamas and Hezbollah, but no one has defined what we mean by ‘terror army.’ I wonder if Assad’s army is not a ‘terror army,’ where the blending didn’t come from terror to the army, but from the army to terror,” said Col. (Res.) Eisin.

“My concern with the Syrian army is that just as Russia commits crimes against humanity in the war against Ukraine, using drone swarms, all the capabilities we see there are the concept of a ‘terror army.’ For example, targeting civilian objectives without calling them such,” added Col. (Res.) Eisin. “I am afraid they do not have conventional military capability, but what Assad’s terror army has built is unconventional asymmetrical capabilities, like terrorism.”

Posted on August 6, 2024

Source: (Excerpt from an article was originally published by Ynetnews on August 3, 2024. Time-related language has been modified to reflect our republication today. See original article at this link.)

Photo Credit: Kremlin.ru/commons.wikimedia.org

Photo License: Wikimedia